Back to Government: The Career Paths of Revolving Door Lobbyists

• In Event: The Ones that Never Knock: Opportunities for Career Advancement and Corruption

Abstract

Why would well-compensated lobbyists take more poorly remunerated positions in government? This paper explores this question by looking at what might induce lobbyists to go through the proverbial revolving door back to Congress. Consistent with previous literature showing that revolving door lobbyists are valuable because of the connections they have in Congress, I show that connections also play a role in the decision of revolving door lobbyists to return to government. In particular, this paper establishes a positive relationship between the number of connections a revolving door lobbyist loses and her decision to return to government as a congressional staffer. In addition, I find that lobbying experience mitigates the effect of lost connections in the sense that a lobbyist with higher level of experience is less likely to return to government when she loses connections. This suggests that the decision to return to Congress may be a conscious choice driven by the loss of political connections.

Author

• Maria Silfa