Not Through Reason Alone: Bernard Williams' Realist Ethical Psychology

• In Event: Poster Session: Normative Political Theory

Abstract

Achen and Bartels (2016) challenges the rationalist model of political behavior that they claim undergirds liberal democratic theory. In doing so they appeal to empirical research in social and political psychology which demonstrates that people’s thinking is influenced by preconscious forces such as affect and emotion, that individual behavior is often the byproduct of a strong sense of group identity, and that overall individuals are not able to bear the normative load that Enlightenment rationalism places upon them. This paper argues that political theorists can incorporate these critiques by drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, and bringing it into dialogue with contemporary research in political psychology. Williams’ model of moral psychology has received little attention from political theorists, but it is primarily concerned with the non-rational dimensions of decision making, particularly the affective function of group identity. In addition, his approach was constructed as a response to the rationalist models of moral theory that he was opposed to. Williams’ approach, I argue, can both be reconciled with the findings of empirical psychology and be used to defend the normative and political value of liberal democracy.

Author

• Benjamin James Hoyt, UC Irvine