Internal Security Threats and WMD Proliferation

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security I

Abstract

Chemical and biological weapons are often regarded as a potential “poor man’s atomic bomb” — a less effective substitute for nuclear weapons, pursued by states that desire, but are unable to acquire, a nuclear deterrent. Yet we observe chemical and biological weapons pursuit by states that have little or no interest in nuclear pursuit. What might motivate these states? I argue that regime insecurity — the risk posed to a regime’s survival by internal, rather than external security threats — serves as a powerful motivator for chemical and biological weapons acquisition, as the increased “useability” of chemical and biological weapons relative to nuclear weapons makes them an attractive tool for responding to domestic threats. While evidence from a few prominent cases suggests that this is a plausible motivation, systematic cross-country analysis of this proposition has so far been lacking. In this paper, I undertake such an analysis, and find that regimes facing greater internal security threats (from either the military, rebel groups, or the population) are more likely to both pursue and acquire chemical and biological weapons. These effects are present even when accounting for incentives to pursue WMD as a means of recouping external deterrence after adopting “coup-proofing” strategies that weaken conventional military forces. Additionally, I find evidence of patterns of chemical weapons use consistent with internal security motivations, even in states that lacked a regime security motivation for their initial pursuit of chemical weapons.

Author

• Miriam Barnum, University of Southern California