Revisiting the League of Nations’ “Failure” and the United Nations’ “Success”

• In Event: Historical Processes and Turning Points in International Relations

Abstract

Why did the United Nations succeed where the League of Nations failed? This is as basic a question as exists in the empirical study of international relations, yet one that remains surprisingly shrouded in ambiguity and beset by half-truths and untested assumptions. This paper examines the most prominent explanations for the League’s “failure” and finds them all wanting, particularly when they are placed in comparison with the United Nations’ “successes.” It then uses this finding to challenge the very premise that the UN has succeeded where the League of Nations previously failed.

The first half of the paper investigates the three most prominent explanations for the League’s “failure.” The first centers around the unwillingness of the United States of America to join the League (the “no American membership” hypothesis). America’s absence certainly hindered the League in notable respects, yet this explanation logically fails to account for the ways in which the League achieved notable successes, particularly in its earliest years, without the participation of the United States.

A second explanation focuses on the League’s impotence in the face of a number of notable crises that helped precipitate the Second World War (the “international crises” hypothesis). The Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Italian invasion of Ethiopia were no doubt grave challenges for the League, and its reputation was damaged by the unsatisfactory way in which it handled each. What this line of reasoning fails to grapple with is that these crises were more symptoms of potential weaknesses with the League than they were the causes of its downfall, however.

A third explanation focuses on the organization and architecture of the League itself (the “structural defects” hypothesis). Three elements of the League’s structure are often highlighted: the ambiguous role of the great power Executive Council relative to the Assembly; the obsession with arbitration and legal mechanisms for preventing war rather than political and military ones; and the frequent requirement for member unanimity to collectively make important decisions and get things done. Yet a careful comparison with the structure of the United Nations demonstrates that the institutional differences between the two organization has been drastically overstated in the time since the UN’s founding.

In the second half of the paper, I argue that the United Nations is only considered to have “succeeded” where the League of Nations “failed” according to two dubious criteria. First, the UN has been much more capable than the League ever was of escaping blame for its shortcomings, thereby finding ways to maintain its legitimacy even in the face of near-constant disappointment. In part as a product of this, and second, the UN has, to put it simply, “succeeded” by continuing to exist. Whereas the League folded in the face of its most visible and profound failures, the UN has found ways to continue to persist and even prosper in the face of failures arguably as profound. Its longevity and persistence are now simply treated as the most direct evidence of its success rather than positive byproducts of it.

More generally, this investigation highlights two potentially disturbing findings for international relations. First, perceptions of institutional success or failure might hinge less on institutional performance—or the ability to help ameliorate the problems they were created to tackle—and more on institutions’ ability to deflect blame for their shortcomings. Second, the ability to hold institutions accountable for direct and profound failures likely declines rapidly as time from institutional creation passes. The paper concludes by examining how well its findings might apply to the Concert of Europe in the 19th century and the Bretton Woods institutions in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Author

• Kyle M. Lascurettes, Lewis & Clark College