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The institution of legal quotas to promote women’s participation in legislative spaces where women are underrepresented is widely regarded as a “best practice” policy. However, studies of quota outcomes frequently reach mixed or contradictory conclusions about quotas’ effectiveness in improving descriptive and substantive representation. Case studies often suggest that quotas succeed in both areas, at least in part, whereas cross-national quantitative studies tend to show a less direct relationship between quotas and descriptive representation than might be expected. One reason for this is that quotas are diverse, both cross-nationally and cross-temporally, in their context, design, and enforcement. Gender quotas may be more or less vulnerable to subversion, but this is difficult to quantify. Researchers making broad comparisons across countries are often limited to measuring quotas using a handful of binary indicators that do not adequately reflect quota variation.
In this paper, I use existing data on gender quotas to produce some relatively simple tools that may help to capture some of these unobserved factors. Using legal provisions for quotas, I calculate the effective de jure quota: the minimum proportion of women legislators mandated by law. This is not always obvious, as many quota laws regulate party candidate lists, not legislative seats, so the type of electoral system or number of viable parties may impact the de jure quota for a particular election. Calculating de jure quotas allows me to measure positive and negative gaps between de jure and de facto representation of women, a possible proxy for societal attitudes towards female leadership and the presence of subversion or non-compliance with quota provisions.