The Political Economy of Resistance by Businesses to Crime in Mexico

• In Event: Justice and Injustice: Political Science Perspectives on Crime and Punishment Mini-Conference: The Political Origins of State Violence

Abstract

The wave of criminal violence currently washing over Latin America inhibits investment by firm
owners as well as domestic and international investors. Firms in the region are also directly
impacted when they become key targets of varied types of crime, including one of the most
common forms of criminal activity: extortive practices under protection rackets run by armed
criminal groups. Yet, firms are not always passive victims of crime. In some instances they
engage in collective mobilization to resist criminal victimization. But this resistance can vary in
both level and form of collective action, with important consequences for local governance. In
this paper I develop a subnational comparative analysis of resistance to criminal protection
rackets by agricultural firms in two municipalities located in the Mexican state of Michoacán. In
one municipality avocado sector firms engaged in highly centralized collective action to
coordinate the use of violence against a drug trafficking organization responsible for their
victimization. But in a second neighboring municipality, collective mobilization by berry sector
firms was comparatively weaker and fragmented. What explains this variation in resistance? I
argue that the strength of preexisting
business associations shapes the nature of resistance to
criminal victimization. Where business associations are robust and cohesive, we can expect firms
to engage in highly coordinated collective action to end their victimization. And where
associations are weak and divided, we can expect firms to coalesce into competing groups with
variation in levels of resources across groups. My focus on the political economy of resistance by
business associations also provides insights into governance in the wake of criminal
victimization. I find that strong business associations that engaged in coordinated violent
collective action can play a fundamental role in working with governments to coproduce formal
order, whereas weak associations instead compete against each other to colonize parts of the
state. The subnational comparative analysis draws on interview, focus group, and participant
observation data collected during extended field research that I conducted in Michoacán over a
period of two months. The findings have implications for broader concerns regarding the
political economy of development, order, and local governance.

Author

• Eduardo Moncada, Barnard College, Columbia University