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Under what circumstances do security institutions fighting organized crime behave without neutrality in the use of force? This research looks at the conditions upon which the state’s security apparatus disproportionately targets some sectors of the society, while holding constant levels of violence, presence of criminal organizations, and socioeconomic characteristics. I answer this question by studying the patterns of arrest and torture during the so-called War on Drugs in Mexico. By looking at an original national survey with embedded list experiments, I provide a relatively unbiased measure of the patterns of use and abuse in law enforcement. I find evidence of a lack of neutrality in the actions by the security apparatus. First, indigenous people are more likely to be arrested, and more so if they live in municipalities where there is mining. Second, law enforcement is more intensive and more abuses are perpetrated against protestors and those who in engage in grassroots social organizations, and this effect seems more intense in areas with mining. While previous literature has provided us with a greater understanding of the explosion of violence after the start of the War on Drugs (Calderón et al., 2015; Osorio, 2018; Flores Macías, 2018), my findings provide evidence of state abuses occurring beyond the realm of legitimate defense and where the perpetrator is more clearly identifiable. Moreover, these findings show how harsher macro strategies to fight organized crime might deepen the discrimination of marginalized groups and allow the security apparatus to (intentionally or unintentionally) benefit private actors with interests that are outside of the fight against crime.