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Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel
The beginning of the second century of debate about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the First World War provides a good opportunity for considering new theoretical and methodological perspectives on the war. Alexandre Debs constructs a game-theoretic model to explain belligerent states’ mutual optimism and how it contributed to the escalation of the July Crisis. Paul Poast and Dan Reiter develop a theory of tripwires based on forward deployment of troops in allied countries, and make the counterfactual argument that British troop deployments in Belgium before the July Crisis would have deterred a German invasion and prevented the First World War. Scott Wolford incorporates intra-coalitional politics into a game-theoretic model of multilateral bargaining over war termination, and argues that the rise of US power created incentives for Britain and France to accept an early but suboptimal peace with Germany in 1918 rather than let the US dominate negotiations. Levy and Mulligan undertake a comparative study of the crises of 1905, 1908-9, 1911, 1912-13, and 1914, based on the argument that one cannot explain why a general war occurred in 1914 without explaining why one did not occur during the four previous crises. Discussants Etel Solingen and Henk Goemans have each written extensively on the First World War.
The Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis - Alexandre Debs, Yale University
A Theory of Tripwires: British Troop Deployments Could Have Stopped World War I - Paul Poast, University of Chicago; Dan Reiter, Emory University
Peace Ending World War I: Theory of Intra-Coalition Politics and War Termination - Scott Wolford, University of Texas
A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors - Jack S. Levy, Rutgers University