Populist Exceptionalism in a Populist Political Culture? The Case of New Zealand

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

In 1848, Karl Marx wrote: ‘a spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism’. In the early 21st century, authoritarian populism is the ideological spectre haunting the world of representative democracy. Around the world, democracies are succumbing to a wave of that phenomenon. In the papers proposed for this panel, we consider the portability of the current concept of populism and ask if analysis of contemporary politics in New Zealand indicates the country is an exception to the populist trend, or an example, particularly if considered in an alternative theoretical frame.

The most influential definition of populism defines the concept as a ‘thin ideology’ with three themes: it is anti-establishment, authoritarian, and nativist (Mudde 2013, 2014). This is a definition apparently critically and contextually shaped by a pluralist and liberal response to contemporary authoritarian populism. It is narrower than that of earlier work drawing on a longer historical record that theorises populism as a facet of responsible party government (for example, Riker 1982).

We speculate that much of the critique of contemporary populism is implicitly based on social choice theories that assert that government by popular majority is an illusion, that voters can only judge governments retrospectively, and that the normative theory of responsible party government is untenable. If so, the current wave of authoritarian populism may be seen as the result of political elites having taken on board this rejection of populist policy responsiveness, particularly under the influence of neo-liberalism. Current European theories compound that error by labelling populism as the problem. But perhaps the problem lies instead in the abandonment of moderate populist policy responsiveness by mainstream political elites, leaving the path open for extremists to capture the ideal of democratic majoritarianism, twisting it in pathological directions.

In a broader definition, as argued by Aslanidis (2015) populism is best seen as a discourse (or discursive frame), invoking the supremacy of popular sovereignty to claim that corrupt elites are defrauding ‘the People’ of their rightful political authority. It is an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign People. While the populist frame may be perverted by authoritarians, its fundamental impulse is democratic, and populism, when mobilised constructively, may enhance the quality of democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012)

New Zealand is a case of a democracy fundamentally based on populist values since the advent of the twentieth century, in the context of a constitution with remarkably few checks and balances on the power of a government. From the mid-1970s, a dealigning party system in the context of first-past-the-post elections led to minority capture of governments followed by the rapid introduction of neo-liberal reforms. After a ‘revolution from below’ in combination with elite errors, and after a series of referendums, governments based on majorities of voter support have been re- institutionalised by the introduction of proportional representation.

The New Zealand First party is New Zealand’s closest match to a populist party (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018). Up until the 2017 election New Zealand First has continued to languish in party preference polling, significantly less than the numbers it had secured in its heyday in 1996 when it had briefly entered government in coalition with the centre-right National Party. The 2017 election results gave New Zealand First 7.2 per cent of the votes, down from 8.7 per cent in 2014, and nine seats in the 120 member Parliament.

Of course the story has a twist. A few weeks later, New Zealand First leader Winston Peters announced he would take New Zealand First into government with the centre-left Labour Party, with support on confidence and supply from the Green Party.

The papers in this panel draw for the most part from the 2017 New Zealand Election Study (NZES). They also draw upon a module of questions estimating populist attitudes asked as part of Module 5 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Fiona Barker’s paper picks up the theoretical debate in more depth, adding analysis of the history of populism in New Zealand. Jack Vowles and Janine Hayward compare data from a content analysis of party programmatic statements with voter attitudes. Kate McMillan takes up the issue of immigration. In global context, New Zealand has one of the highest ratios of foreign-born residents to its population, and while Europeans retain dwindling majority status. New Zealand’s ethnic diversity is now among the highest in the world. Lara Greaves and Janine Hayward draw on one case where populism and ethnic minority rights sometimes clash in New Zealand: dedicated electoral districts for indigenous Māori who chose to vote in them, rather than in the ‘general’ electorates.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 36: Elections and Voting Behavior

Individual Presentations

• European Populist Theory: Does it Carry Across Continents? - Fiona C. Barker, Victoria University of Wellington

• Populism, New Zealand Political Parties and Voters: Does the Coat Fit? - Janine Hayward, University of Otago; Jack Vowles, Victoria University of Wellington

• Populism Lite? Immigration and Electoral Politics in New Zealand - Kate McMillan, Victoria University of Wellington

Chair

• Jack Vowles Victoria University of Wellington

Discussants

• Matt Golder Pennsylvania State University

• Todd Donovan Western Washington University