The Coalitional Dynamics of Distributive Politics in the Knowledge Economy

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Over the past decade, a debate has emerged in Comparative Political Economy over the relative importance of mass vs. elite politics. Mass politics studies focus on voter preferences and electoral dynamics of mobilization, realignment and representation to explain both policy change and (changing) political responsiveness in a context of declining mainstream parties and growing radical parties. Studies in the tradition of elite politics, by contrast, claim a decreasing relevance of electoral politics, and focus on the structural or political power of particular producer groups to explain the same outcomes. Both strands of literature, however, share a joint interest and attention to the changing dynamics of coalition-formation in current reform politics. This panel explores the ways in which the analysis of coalitions may be a promising avenue to link mass and elite politics and to theorize the determinants of particular coalitions to form or prevail. The coalitions-argument may allow to transcend the dichotomy between mass and elite politics by highlighting the ways in which producer interest enter into structural or opportunistic alliances with political parties.
The contribution by Hall & Evans focuses on the negative consequences of upper-class- and producer-group led politics on political representation for particular social groups, and the mobilization (in the electoral arena) of new, radical parties to challenge these gaps in representation. Similarly, the contribution by Iversen & Elkjaer addresses the question to which extent “the rich” (i.e. economic elites) are or are not undermining middle- and lower-class oriented (re)distributive mass politics. They thereby speak directly to (and take issue with) a literature, which considers democratic politics as being captured by economic elites, and thereby they engage in a direct and controversial discussion with the findings of the first paper. These contributions thereby also address the theorization of “hegemonic producer groups”, a perspective Baccaro & Pontusson develop in their contribution. They argue that electoral politics is essentially a constraint—not a “driver”—of policy choices that determine economic growth trajectories The paper by Häusermann/Ares/Enggist & Pinggera, by contrast, theorizes the conditions that explain the relative importance of encompassing vs. more elitist coalitions driving distributive reforms. They argue that where a socio-cultural political cleavage is salient, an (upper middle class&elite) coalition of middle-class voters, liberal political parties, and producer groups from the post-industrial sectors forms around the prioritization of social investment policies, thereby opposing a coalition of working-class voters, protectionist parties and producer groups from industrial sectors who prioritize the defense of existing welfare policies.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 15: European Politics and Society

Individual Presentations

• Democracy and Economic Interests: Subverted Democracy or Middle-Class Supremacy? - Torben Iversen, Harvard University; Mads Andreas Elkjaer, University of Oxford

• 2. Representation Gaps: Partisan Competition and Popular Preferences - Peter A. Hall, Harvard University; Georgina Evans, Harvard University

• Classes, Sectoral Interests and Elites: The Politics of Growth Models - Lucio Baccaro, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies; Jonas Pontusson, University of Geneva

• The Limits of Solidarity. Political Coalitions around Distributive Priorities - Macarena Ares, University of Zurich; Matthias Enggist, University of Zurich; Michael Pinggera, University of Zurich; Silja Haeusermann, University of Zurich

Chair

• Herbert Kitschelt Duke University

Discussants

• Herbert Kitschelt Duke University

• Paul Pierson University of California, Berkeley