The Role of Bureaucrats in International Cooperation

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

What role do bureaucrats play in promoting or shaping the terms of cooperation between states? To facilitate cooperation states often delegate to institutions, both international and domestic. The bureaucrats who make up these institutions may then play a decisive role in shaping term of cooperation. Alternatively states may continue to exercise influence over bureaucrats through both formal and informal means. This panel explores the these competing forces across diverse institutional settings. Kennard and Stanescu explore the individual impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) department heads on regional lending policies. Employing an event study they find that the appointment of new department heads has a statistically significant impact on risk premia throughout the affected region, though the direction of the effect differs with bureaucratic characteristics. Similarly Malis and You show that the identity of U.S. ambassadorial personnel matters. During periods of ambassadorial vacancies foreign lobbying expenditures within the U.S. decrease, consistent with the observation that acting officials tend to preserve the status quo. This reduces uncertainty and the need for information gathering via lobbying. Strezhnev studies how member states may continue to discipline the actions of international bureaucrats via career incentives in the International Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID). Using an event history analysis of reappointment decisions he shows that arbitrators issuing dissenting opinions are far less likely to be re-appointed, a finding consistent with the otherwise surprising frequency of unanimous opinions in investment arbitration. Finally Arias suggests state control of bureaucrats may manifest through informal channels as well. Employing a natural experiment in the context of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body he shows that co-national justices are more likely to deliver rulings favorable to their own country. The effect is driven in particular by the United States. Taken together the papers suggest a new research agenda exploring the independence versus accountability of bureaucrats in international cooperation.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 17: International Collaboration

Individual Presentations

• Do International Bureaucrats Matter? Evidence from IMF Staff Appointments - Amanda Kennard, New York University; Diana Stanescu, Princeton University

• Diplomacy and Foreign Lobbying - Matt Malis, New York University; Hye Young You, New York University

• You Only Dissent Once: Re-Appointment & Legal Practice in Investment Arbitration - Anton Strezhnev, University of Pennsylvania

• Impartiality In International Courts: Evidence From A Natural Experiment - Eric Arias, College of William & Mary

Chair

• David E. Lewis Vanderbilt University

Discussants

• Erik Voeten Georgetown University

• Jana von Stein The Australian National University