The Process of Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Traditionally, scholars have tended to study nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation in a binary fashion: either a state is pursuing nuclear weapons or it isn’t; either a state has the bomb or it doesn’t; either a state seeks to prevent proliferation or it acquiesces; either nonproliferation efforts succeed or they fail. The four papers on this panel challenge this simple portrayal, adding nuance to our understanding of nuclear dynamics by examining the process of proliferation and nonproliferation.

Tristan Volpe’s paper examines states that are midway through the proliferation process; namely, those with significant nuclear capacity that do not yet possess the bomb. He argues that whether a latent state attempts to leverage its capabilities to secure political concessions depends on the characteristics of the nuclear technology it possesses: if the technology is plausibly either military or civilian in intent, such coercive attempts are more likely. In contrast, if the technology is more clearly either military or civilian in orientation, this limits a latent state’s ability to compel concessions. In a similar vein, Ariel Petrovics explores countries that are in the process of pursuing nuclear weapons, disaggregating and assessing the effectiveness of various nonproliferation policies, for example sanctions vs. positive inducements. Her paper models the rate or speed at which nonproliferation policies succeed, as opposed to simply whether they work or do not, which allows for a more fine-grained assessment of the impact of nonproliferation efforts. Based on a statistical analysis of country-years between 1945 and 2012, she finds that inducements tend to work better and faster than coercive sanctions, a finding with important policy implications.

Nicholas Miller analyzes what happens to nonproliferation policies after they fail and a new country acquires nuclear weapons—in other words, how states manage new nuclear powers. Focusing on the United States, he develops a new typology of policies for managing emerging nuclear powers and proposes a theory for explaining why the United States chooses one policy over another, which depends on the political relationship with the proliferator and the state of the nonproliferation regime. The evidence suggests that the introduction of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had major effects on how the United States manages new nuclear powers, leading Washington to conceal instead of coopt the arsenals of friendly countries and seek rollback rather than containment of arsenals possessed by friendly or unaligned states. Finally, Jayita Sarkar examines the process through which nonproliferation policy is developed in the United States, in particular focusing on the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the mid-1970s, a cartel that manages global trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Challenging binary portrayals of commitment to nonproliferation, she shows that US policymakers were motivated both by economic concerns (in particular, protecting US market share in nuclear technology) and also security concerns linked to nonproliferation.

Collectively the four papers on this panel expand our understanding of the process of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation and open up new avenues of inquiry for scholars of nuclear dynamics. They draw on a wide range of methodological approaches, both qualitative, quantitative, and archival. Finally, they promise to hold useful policy implications for the United States and other actors that seek to manage the proliferation process internationally.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 19: International Security

Individual Presentations

• Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers - Nicholas Miller, Dartmouth College

• Beating the (Nuclear) Clock: Testing the Rate of Counterproliferation Policy - Ariel F.W. Petrovics, Harvard University

• The Economic Drivers behind the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 1974-1980 - Jayita Sarkar, Boston University

• Leveraging Latency: How Technology Shapes the Attractiveness of Nuclear Bargains - Tristan A. Volpe, Naval Postgraduate School

Chair

• Mark S. Bell University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

Discussant

• Vipin Narang Massachusetts Institute of Technology