Democratic Institutions in Authoritarian Regimes

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

One of the most remarkable facts about contemporary quasi-democratic regimes (including populist, illiberal, and competitive authoritarian varieties) is the deftness with which they have appropriated institutions associated with democratic self-rule and mobilized them towards their own ends. This strategy allows these regimes to preserve the veneer of democracy while undermining many of the values associated with it. While empirical political scientists have investigated the institutional dynamics of “democracy with adjectives” (Collier 1997), the normative debate has focused on conceptual questions such as whether populism should be considered an extreme (or pathological) form of democracy or a deviation from its core values (Urbinati 2014, Müller 2016, Isaac 2017, Mounk 2018). The papers on this panel bridge these literatures by reflecting on the ways in which institutions traditionally associated with democratic self-rule have been appropriated in authoritarian contexts. Each of the papers highlights the need to take on board empirical research about how populist or quasi-democratic regimes function in order to better understand the normative value and significance of these institutions.

While democratic theorists have traditionally cast elections as a vehicle of collective self-rule and/or as an expression of the political equality of citizens, three of the papers show that the meaning of elections is dependent on the regime context. Bagg focuses on the realist defense of popular elections as a means to thwart state capture, arguing that competitive authoritarian regimes repurpose this institution as a way of entrenching their control. According to Bagg, this presents vexing challenges for partisans of democracy by pitting essential democratic commitments against one another and forcing a choice between them.

Taking aim at traditional accounts of legitimate opposition, Kirshner argues that they have assumed a democratic regime context, thereby failing to fully grasp the moral stakes of opposition survival. Even inegalitarian systems can instantiate a valuable respect for citizens’ agency, Kirshner argues, if they allow citizens opportunities to collectively impact outcomes that matter. By contrast, regimes that thwart meaningful opportunities for opposition treat their citizens as tools even if they allow them to participate in elections.

Isiksel and Pepinsky focus on the distinctive moral considerations facing individual voters in elections under authoritarianism. They point out that the same civic imperatives that support voting in democracies may come out in favor of boycotts, abstentions, or even civil disobedience under such conditions. Whether or not citizens should participate in elections under authoritarianism, they argue, depends not merely on principled justifications for political participation but also on prudential considerations about the impact that electoral participation is likely to have on the regime’s longevity.

While elections are often cast as the defining feature of modern democracy, many scholars see an independent judiciary as integral to maintaining the framework of democratic self-rule. The paper by Pozas-Loyo and Rios looks at the role of judicial appointments and promotions in authoritarian regime survival. They argue the institutional structure of the judiciary contributed to the stability of the regime, and that some of the informal institutions of that era not only survived the transition to democracy, but have undermined democratic consolidation.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 2: Foundations of Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Judicial Independence in a Competitive Authoritarian Regime - Andrea Pozas-Loyo, UNAM-IIJ; Julio Rios-Figueroa, CIDE

• Opposition, Populism and the Specter of Electoral Autocracy - Alexander Kirshner, Duke University

• How to Defend Democracy: Normative Priorities for a Tragic World - Samuel Ely Bagg, Oxford University

• Voting in Authoritarian Regimes - Turkuler Isiksel, Columbia University; Thomas Pepinsky, Cornell University

Chair

• Corey L. Brettschneider

Discussants

• Eric Beerbohm Harvard University

• Anne Meng University of Virginia