Inequalities in Representation: The Ability of Elites to Represent Citizens

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

With the recent growth of populist movements, it is hard to overstate the importance of strengthening the links between voters and their representatives. This panel presents new research on the challenges of translating public preferences into policy outputs, with a focus on the individual constraints and motivations faced by legislators: cognitive biases, economic inequalities, and electoral incentives. The papers advance new theories to explain inequalities in responsiveness in established democracies and engage with a wealth of empirical strategies (e.g., survey experiments, field experiments, machine learning based analyses) to assess these questions.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 11: Comparative Politics

Individual Presentations

• Why do Politicians Misperceive Voter Preferences? - Miguel Maria Pereira, Washington University in St. Louis

• Strategic Responsiveness? Electoral Incentives and Constituency Responsiveness - Nathalie Giger, University of Mannheim; Simon Lanz, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva

• Why are Representatives More Responsive to the Rich (even in Sweden)? - Mikael Persson, University of Gothenburg

• Bridging a Gap? Policy Congruence between Elites and Citizens with Disabilities - Stefanie Reher, University of Strathclyde

Chair

• Mikael Persson University of Gothenburg

Discussants

• Christopher Wlezien University of Texas at Austin

• Peter Enns Cornell University