Latin American Clientelism: Who Benefits and How does it Affect Policy?

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel combines various approaches to new forms of clientelism in Latin America. Clientelism is a common strategy for both parties and individual candidates in targeting voters. On this panel, we have four papers that consider when clientelist strategies are used and how this strategy affects access to government resources, such as infrastructure and housing. The papers on this panel ask (1) when are clientelist strategies prioritized and how do they influence party-building strategies, (2) how does the use of clientelism affect access to resources, and (3) how do clientelist strategies influence government policies?

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 12: Comparative Politics in Developing Countries

Individual Presentations

• Informal Institutions, Continuities and Ruptures in Brazil’s Regional Politics - Jorge Antonio Alves, Queens College, CUNY

• Squatters, Brokers, and Mayors: The Distributive Politics of Housing Policy - Aimée Bourassa, Brown University

• Club Goods Provision: The Effect of Weak Political Parties on Allocation - Katherine Marie McKiernan, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Chair

• Tesalia Rizzo Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Discussants

• Anderson Frey University of Rochester

• Alicia Dailey Cooperman Princeton University