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Strategic Decisions on Economic Sanctions

Thu, August 29, 12:00 to 1:30pm, Hilton, Lincoln East

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Panel Proposal: Strategic Decisions on Economic Sanctions

This panel aims to improve our understanding on non-state actors that are understudied in the literature on economic coercion, yet central to sanctions policies. The existing literature on economic sanctions is heavily focused on the sender and the target governments. In this panel, we are bringing papers together to theoretically and empirically investigate the role of legislators, firms, and international organizations in sanctioning processes.

First, Marinov and Tama study how the U.S. Congress designs economic sanctions and when the legislature allows the President flexibility about particular sanctions policies. Second, Allen and Yuen examine when the permanent members use the UN Security Council to impose economic sanctions, and when they act outside of the Council. Third, Bapat, Early, Grauvogel and Kleinberg examine senders’ efforts to enforce sanctions and demonstrate that they have incentives to limit their enforcement to ensure that their firms do not lose market share to foreign competitors. Lastly, Cilizoglu studies firms’ behavior in the period after sanctions removal and investigates when firms choose to invest or re-invest in previously targeted economies. Collectively, the papers in this panel contribute to a deeper theoretical and empirical understanding of the preferences and actions of various non-state actors involved in sanctions processes.

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