Political Instability and the Deep History of State Making

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

An immense variety of theoretical frameworks have been applied to the question of state building. For instance, different modernization frameworks have highlighted explanatory factors such as sedentary agriculture, urbanization, population growth, division of labor, increased productivity, and wealth (Abramson 2016; Boix 2015; Boserup 1965; Childe 1973 [1950]; Diamond 1992; Galor & Weil 2000; Green 2012; Herbst 2014; Johnson, Earle 2000; Petersen, Skaaning 2010). Other frameworks have focused on, for instance, social mobilization (Huntington 1968); elite cohesion/division (Waldner 1999); class conflict and social coalitions (Engels 2010; Fried 1967; Marx, Engels 1978); networks (Mann 1986); ethnicity (Smith 1986); warfare (Tilly 1975, 2001); diffusion (Petersen, Skaaning 2010); internal organization and bureaucracy (Hintze 1975; Weber 1978); demands for efficiency (Barzel 2002); and historical conjunctures (Coleman, Binder 1971).

The purpose of this panel is twofold. The first is to put state building in a deep historical perspective, going beyond the previous focus on the early modern period and extending time coverage to also include medieval times. The second is to put research on state building into conversation with the literature on political stability, or leadership tenure. We want to query what was governed, or what government was about, in relation to who governed. To exemplify the relevance of the link between political stability and state building, consider differences in leader tenure and how they may influence attempts at state building. Differences in tenure may not only matter for the experiences and capacities of the leader in question, which could form policies and determine the success of attempts to build states. In addition, anticipated differences in tenure length may matter for the incentives to spend precious resources on building state institutions in the first place (e.g., Besley, Persson 2011). Successful state building is inevitably a drawn-out process, and in systems where leaders anticipate to be quickly removed from office, leaders may rather want to channel resources to other activities that give more immediate benefits.

As is the case for state capacity and patterns of state building, also leadership tenure and related measures of political (in-)stability display large historical variation. Extant studies have shown leader tenure to vary enormously across different political systems. At one extreme, prime ministers of caretaker governments or leaders of fragile states may occupy office only for a few days or weeks. At the other extreme, one may count autocratic rulers who inherit office at a young age and are blessed with stable rule. For the successful autocrat, the only limiting factor is human longevity.

Numerous studies have focused on leadership succession (Abramson, Rivera 2016; Acharya, Lee 2016; Beckman 1986; Bes 2012; Brownlee 2007; Burling 1974; Canseco, Murra 1960; Corcos 2012; Ebrey 2006; Fichtner 1989; Goody 1966; Herz 1952; Kechichian 2001; Kokkonen, Sundell 2014; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Lachaud, Penman 2008; Lewis 1981; Marafioti 2014; McGowan 2003; Nenner 1995 Ottino 1983; Rounds 1982; Stephenson 1927; Stewart 1978; Suwannathat-Pian 1993; Whitaker 1976). Only a few studies focus on leadership tenure, most of which are limited to the modern era (Bienen, van de Walle 1991; Boix, Svolik 2013; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza, Goemans 2003, 2004; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi, Przeworski 2007; Lindberg, Teorell 2018; Svolik 2012). One exception is Blaydes and Chaney (2013), who show how the tenure of European and Islamic leaders diverged in the pre-modern era, which they interpret as a signal of greater constraints on the executive in Europe (lowering the need and the potential payoffs for those who might challenge the ruler militarily).

The panel consists of four papers by historically oriented political scientists and historians. The papers engage in novel theoretical perspectives, and query novel data sources employing a large variety of methods. The main common denominator of the four papers is an interest in the historical emergence of the modern state from an actor-centric perspective.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 7: Politics and History

Individual Presentations

• Shifting Regimes: State Formation and Political Reform in Early Modern Sweden - Magnus Linnarsson, Stockholm University

• Blood is Thicker than Water: Family Assets and Leader Deposition - Andrej Kokkonen, University of Gothenburg; Suthan Krishnarajan, Aarhus University; Jorgen Moller, University of Aarhus; Anders Sundell, University of Gothenburg

• Tracing the Origins of the Modern State - Christoffer Cappelen, University of Copenhagen; Jacob Gerner Hariri, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

• Leadership Tenure: A Comprehensive Historical Analysis - John Gerring, University of Texas, Austin; Carl Henrik Knutsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo; Klas Nilsson, Center for European Studies; Daniel Smith, University of Maryland; Jan Teorell, Lund University

Chair

• Sheri Berman Barnard College, Columbia University

Discussants

• Sheri Berman Barnard College, Columbia University

• Alexander Lee University of Rochester