International Economics and War

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The papers on this panel employ formal and structural methods to address questions at the intersection of international political economy (IPE) and international security studies (ISS). How does military power affect the flow of goods in a many-country international economy (Carroll and Cooper)? How do governments choose among competing coercive instruments in international bargaining settings (Coe)? How does military coercion affect the trade policies governments adopt in times of peace (Cooley)? And how does the shadow of major-power intervention affect the likelihood of civil war (Gibilisco and Montero)? Jointly, these papers bridge IPE and ISS by considering simultaneously the domestic political economic determinants of security policies and the effect of these security policies on domestic outcomes, such as trade policies and civil war.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Global International Relations: An Algebraic Approach - Robert J. Carroll, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

• Rationalist Explanations for Costly Conflict - Andrew J. Coe, Vanderbilt University

• Trade Policy in the Shadow of Power - Brendan Cooley, Princeton University

• Is Civil War Focal? Expectations about Major Power Intervention - Michael Gibilisco, California Institute of Technology; Sergio Montero, University of Rochester

Chair

• James D. Fearon Stanford University

Discussants

• Alexandre Debs Yale University

• Allison Carnegie Columbia University