Paramilitaries, Praetorians, Police: Designing & Deploying State Security Forces

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

How do states design their security sectors, and what are the consequences of relying on one type of force versus another to defend against various threats to the regime? National militaries have long held a privileged place in political science research on domestic and international security. However, there are many important differences between national militaries, often obscured in research on civil-military relations by umbrella categories like patrimonialism versus professionalism that require careful conceptual disaggregation. In addition, recent work recognizes that the military is but one security institution at the state’s disposal. When leaders feel threatened by civil war, coups, or mass protests, they often rely on parallel security forces to do jobs that we typically associate with more traditional armed forces. Paramilitaries, pro-government militias, praetorian guards, and police forces are but some of the security forces that recent scholarship has identified as important for understanding the broader security context, especially in developing or authoritarian states.
Leaders may design these forces with distinct missions in mind. As a result, we should expect states to deploy them in different circumstances or against different kinds of threats. Similarly, their differences in their design are likely intended to produce a variety of outcomes, such as enhanced loyalty, more effective repression, or coup-prevention. Variation in ethnic recruitment, ideological loyalty, and equipment, training, and doctrine can all influence when states deploy different types of security forces and how they behave once deployed. While political science research is beginning to acknowledge these differences, there is still much work that can be done to advance our understanding of why they occur, how they affect security force deployment, and the consequences for important political events—including coup attempts, violent and non-violent protests, and conventional conflict. This panel contributes to this growing literature by bringing diverse scholars together who share an interest in understanding the many ways states design and use their security forces.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 21: Conflict Processes

Individual Presentations

• Unpacking Ethnic Stacking: The Uses and Abuses of Identity in Security Forces - Nathaniel Allen; Risa A. Brooks, Marquette University

• The Leader’s Toolkit: How Leaders Choose Their Tools of Repression - Lora DiBlasi, Michigan State University

• Divided Loyalty: Are Conscript Militaries Less Likely to Repress Protesters? - Paul Lorenzo Johnson, US Air Force; Max Zeldes Margulies, United States Military Academy

• Security Assistance and Respect for Human Rights in Developing Militaries - Renanah Miles Joyce, Columbia University

Chair

• Neil J. Mitchell University College London

Discussant

• Erica Susanne De Bruin Hamilton College