Behavioral Models of Politics

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Over the last few years, there has been increased interest in the deviations from rational choice political actors exhibit. This panel brings together cutting edge research on formal models of politics that use the tools of behavioral game theory as applied to the structure of political institutions and the formation of political beliefs. Patty and Penn study the informal aspects of institutions such as their mission, and explore the endogenous formation of preferences within an organization. Diermeier and Li consider the interaction between affective polarization and elite behavior in American Politics. They present a dynamic model that studies the long term policy effects of transitory shocks to partisan affect. Kocak looks into a bandit problem with reputation concerns, in the context of an incumbent politician directing information collection efforts to justify her positions rather than optimizing policy choice, when voters are sequential updaters. Little, Schnakenberg, and Turner study a model of political accountability where a heterogeneous group of voters exhibits various forms and degrees of motivated reasoning.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 4: Formal Political Theory

Chair

• David A. Siegel Duke University

Discussant

• Andrew Little University of California-Berkeley

Individual Presentations

• Identity and Information in Organizations - John W. Patty, Emory University; Elizabeth Maggie Penn, Emory University

• A Dynamic Model of Affective Polarization - Daniel Diermeier, University of Chicago; Christopher Miao Li, Yale University

• Talking Points: A Bandit Theory of Political Agency - Korhan Kocak, Princeton University

• Motivated Reasoning and Political Accountability - Andrew Little, University of California-Berkeley; Keith E. Schnakenberg, Washington University; Ian R. Turner, Yale University