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Session Submission Type: Created Panel
Political economists long have thought about how to maintain the independence of central banks, and how central banks in turn affect policy. These papers offer new perspectives on the threats to and actions of central banks.
When Doves Act Like Hawks: Central Bank Independence and Monetary Preferences - Daniel Hansen, Carnegie Mellon University; Cristina Bodea, Michigan State University
Autocratic Central Banks and Monetary Policy Credibility - Susanne Mueller-Redwood, University of Wisconsin, Madison
After Delegation: Central Banks and the Politicization of Technocracy - Benjamin Braun, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies; Maximilian Gustav-Adolf Düsterhöft, Technische Universität Dresden