Formal Models of International Politics

Session Submission Type: Created Panel

Session Description

The papers on this panel employ formal and structural methods to address various topics of international politics. Kennard develops an infinite horizon model of coalitional bargaining to study why some states form broad coalitions with obvious veto power while others instead form narrow, issue-specific coalitions ostensibly with little hope of influencing negotiations. Kenkel and Ramsay structurally estimate a model of bargaining and war in order to quantify the effects of the distribution of power and beliefs about costs on crisis outcomes. Fearon analyzes static and dynamic game-theoretic models that can produce both "calm" and "hair trigger" equilibria, and allow analysis of factors that make reciprocal fears situations more or less explosive. Di Lonardo develops a formal model to assess the strategic consequences that deterring terrorism has on the long-term success against violent groups.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• The Rise of Bargaining Coalitions in Multilateral Regimes - Amanda Kennard, New York University

• A Quantitative Bargaining Theory of War - Brenton Kenkel, Vanderbilt University; Kristopher W. Ramsay, Princeton University

• Coups, Police Shootings, and Nuclear War - James D. Fearon, Stanford University

• Overvaluing Deterrence in Counterterrorism - Livio Di Lonardo, Bocconi University

Chair

• John Benedict Londregan Princeton University

Discussant

• Michael Gibilisco California Institute of Technology