Agency and Accountability

Session Submission Type: Created Panel

Session Description

Li, Sasso and Turner study a model of electoral accountability and policymaking in a voter-politician-bureaucrat hierarchy. Slough develops a model of electoral accountability to study how variation in bureaucratic quality influence voters’ ability to select politicians. Dragu and Godel study develop a dynamic principal-agent model in which a government can choose a policy to alter the incentives of the agency in the wake of a prevention failure to show that the optimal prevention policy is not politically feasible. Invernizzi and Prato study the internal organization of political parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party principal and two factions.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 4: Formal Political Theory

Chair

• Sean Gailmard University of California, Berkeley

Discussant

• Germán Sergio Gieczewski Princeton University

Individual Presentations

• Accountability in Governing Hierarchies - Christopher Miao Li, Yale University; Gregory Sasso, Università Bocconi; Ian R. Turner, Yale University

• A Model of Electoral Accountability and Bureaucracy - Tara L Slough, Columbia University

• Optimal Prevention? Dynamic Moral Hazard in Political Principal-Agent Problems - Tiberiu C. Dragu, New York University; William P Godel, New York University

• Contests, Factions, and Party Organization - Giovanna Invernizzi, Columbia University; Carlo Prato, Columbia University