Authoritarian Politics

Session Submission Type: Created Panel

Session Description

Takagi and Hanpu develop a formal model to study when it is optimal for a dictator to make a concession in order to avoid revolutions. Rozenas and Luo develop a unified model that integrates the Bayesian persuasion and the `cheap-talk' approaches which helps to understand how strategic actors would choose to manipulate information when they have multiple options. Londregan constructs a formal model in which high levels of internal conflict actually deter governments from engaging in wars in order to avoid the change in the internal balance of power, in the form of extended voting rights and government benefits, that would result from even a victorious war. Bernhardt, Krasa and Shadmehr develop a formal model to show that that the damaging effect of demagogues and their chances of success is higher in hard times.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 4: Formal Political Theory

Chair

• Tiberiu C. Dragu New York University

Discussant

• Jack Paine University of Rochester

Individual Presentations

• Concessions and Information Cascades in Autocracies - Yuki Takagi, Department of Political Science, Stanford University; Hans Hanpu Tung, National Taiwan University

• Demagogues and the Instability of Democracy - Dan Bernhardt, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Stefan Krasa, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Mehdi Shadmehr, University of Calgary

• Strategic Information Manipulation: A Unified Framework - Arturas Rozenas, New York University; Zhaotian Luo, University of Chicago

• The Authoritarian Peace: Latin American in the Twentieth Century. - John Benedict Londregan, Princeton University