Lobbying and Governmental Policy

Session Submission Type: Created Panel

Session Description

The papers on this panel employ formal methods to address various topics of lobbying and policy formation. Judd studies a model of legislative policymaking with interest groups to show that, under broad conditions, groups forgo access to a range of more centrist legislators. Sasso and Alexander analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign spending and lobbying to demonstrate that interest-group and candidate polarization must be considered jointly, as it is the relative values of these quantities that is most important for campaign spending and final policy location. Simpson and Horz develop a game-theoretic model to understand what conditions determine the degree to which public prosecutors can remain free from political interference. Gailmard develops a formal model to examine the extent to which an executive’s professional reputation impacts his or her willingness to act unilaterally

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Access and Lobbying in Legislatures - Gleason Judd, Princeton University

• Interest Group Competition over Campaign Spending and Lobbying - Gregory Sasso, Università Bocconi; Dan Alexander, University of Rochester

• Political Interventions in the Administration of Justice - Hannah Simpson, Texas A&M University; Carlo Matthias Horz, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

• Reputation, Unilateral Action, and Bureaucratic Leadership - Lindsey Gailmard, California Institute of Technology

Chair

• Zhaotian Luo University of Chicago

Discussant

• Benjamin Ogden Texas A&M University