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Session Submission Type: Poster Session
The papers on this panel employ formal and experimental methods to address various topics of domestic and international politics. Yu develops a model of office incentives in a decentralized experimentation setting where agents are motivated by organizational goals. Aldama Navarrete and Vasquez Cortes analyze whether stronger or weaker authorities are more likely to instill fear in their citizenry. Zu develops formal models on how the political media affect the dynamics of student movements in China based on the empirical cases—Beijing 1989 Protest, 2012 Hong Kong Central Occupation Movement and 2014 Taipei Sunflower Movement. Uribe develops a formal model of judicial selection; the model accounts for the institutional design of the judiciary/government, allows judges to make decisions that are both policy and career motivated, and allows the selector to compensate for the ways in which the judge's decisions will deviate from their own ideology as well as the ideology of the selector. Konstantinidis and Pascoe considers the strategic rationale and effects of conscription upon intrastate conflict processes.
Career Incentives for Experimenting Agents - Tinghua Yu, London School of Economics
Fearmongering - Abraham Samuel Aldama Navarrete, New York University; Mateo Vasquez Cortes, New York University
How Media Influence the Student Protests in China - Gary Ziwen Zu, Duke University
Preparing for the Future: A Model of Judicial Selection - Alicia Uribe-McGuire, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Volunteers, Conscripts and Insurgents: The Role of Manpower in Regime Politics - Nikitas Konstantinidis, IE University; Henry Pascoe, IE University