Informal and Private: Veto Threats Over the Freedom of Information Act

• In Event: Presidents and Legislatures: A Complicated Relationship

Abstract

The Constitution grants the president a formal role in the law-making process through the veto power. Neustadt taught us that presidential power is the power to persuade that the president can employ to bargain during the legislative development process. Building from Azari and Smith’s (2012) work, this research demonstrates how the veto bargaining functions as an informal institution operating within the formal rules and constraints of the legislative development process, as there are no formal rules to govern presidential bargaining with Congress. The president’s power to persuade becomes contextual and situational to the issue, individual, and moment in time. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is employed as a case to examine a policy issue that presidents do not want, as it serves as a congressional check on executive power. By examining the development of FOIA and the first amendment to the bill, we can examine how and why presidents will choose to employ a private versus public bargaining strategy based on the context in which they find themselves. Using the same policy issue across three administrations – Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford – provides consistency in examining the political contexts on an issue each president wanted to avoid, but was forced to engage with by Congress. Understanding veto threats as an informal institution provides the context to understand why presidents may choose to “go private” instead of public as a strategy. In this way, a benefit exists for presidents to seek to persuade and influence policy outcomes outside of the public eye. Original archival research was conducted to provide the context-rich examination of the internal White House conversations along with the conversations between the president and Congress.

Author

• Kevin M. Baron, Austin Peay State University