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A free and independent press monitors government actions, broadcasts public grievances, and facilitates debate and dissent among citizens. Because of this, some governments run interference – censoring newspapers, harassing journalists, and shutting down media outlets. But, other governments do not. What explains this? We propose that executives decide to repress or to respect the press based on the sanctions they anticipate from two important constituencies: courts and citizens. We expect that attacks are less likely where courts can make adverse rulings and where citizens can vote leaders out of office. In addition, we suggest that these constraints function as substitutes. Essentially, the reductive effect of judicial independence wanes as the level of electoral democracy rises, making courts vital to protecting journalists in non-democratic regimes. We evaluate these expectations using panel data on government attacks on the media in 170 countries, from 1948 to 2012, and find strong and consistent support.