The Expertise Curse: How Policy Expertise can Hinder Responsiveness

• In Event: Political Elites and Policymaking

Abstract

To channel voter preferences, representatives have to rely on perceptions of public opinion. However, existing research suggests that legislators often have a distorted image of their constituency. We argue that policy expertise constrains the ability of politicians to be responsive. Public officials with more experience and knowledge of a given policy issue have more confidence in their own issue-specific positions. Enhanced confidence, in turn, may lead elites to dismiss opinions they disagree with. We find evidence consistent with this argument in an original experiment with Swedish representatives. Politicians with more expertise in a given policy area are more likely to disregard appeals from voters holding contrasting opinions. Issue experts are also less likely to recognize that opposing views may represent the majority opinion. Observational data from the Riksdag Parliamentary Survey complement these findings. Together, the results suggest that representatives with more expertise in a given policy area are paradoxically less capable of channeling public preferences in that same field. The study contributes to our understanding of biases in elite decision-making and provides a novel explanation for distortions in political representation.

Authors

• Miguel M. Pereira, University of Southern California

• Patrik Ohberg, The Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg