Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies

• In Event: The Interaction of Repression and Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

The existence of nominally democratic institutions, such as elections and legislatures, raises questions regarding the strategies of political opposition in autocracies. Why do some non-regime political parties in autocracies compete in legislative elections while others engage in a boycott? While the existing literature heavily focuses on the unfair electoral processes, this paper examines the effects of legislative rules that are instituted to the advantage of an incumbent. Autocratic leaders can strategically institute legislative rules, such as a ``Priority Clause'' or ``Appointment Clause,'' to prevent the passage of unwanted legislation. In a departure from existing assumptions that opposition parties are less interested in policymaking, I theorize that some non-regime political parties build expectations about their future legislative influence, and they may mobilize against those rules in an election period to delegitimize unilaterally instituted rules. I find some empirical support for the expectation: political parties in autocracies are more likely to engage in a boycott if there exists the ``Priority Clause.'' The positive effects of these rules are weaker in presidential elections. The results suggest that legislative rules can act as important determinants of an opposition boycott, but they can also be considered a form of government resources that non-regime parties can achieve by competing in presidential elections.

Author

• Ae sil Woo, Gettysburg College