The Bear is Back in the Bush: Russian Military Intervention in Africa

• In Event: Russia's Domestic Traits and Foreign Policy

Abstract

The October 2019 Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum brought representatives of all the states of Africa, including forty-five heads of state, to Sochi, Russia. This summit was just the most formal expression of Russia’s recent interest in Africa, motivated by its own need for markets and a desire to once again be seen as a world power. At the summit, Putin announced Russia had provided $20 billion to Africa, in a combination of trade preferences, relief of Africa’s Soviet-era debts, humanitarian aid, and educational programs. Numerous memoranda of understanding on trade and building projects were signed.

Yet far more reflective of Russia’s involvement in Africa are the photos of African delegates holding Kalashnikov rifles at the summit. Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, with 39 percent of the share between 2013 and 2017. Those sales have increased, doubling since 2012. In the last two years, Russia has increased its military presence in Africa. In 2018, it donated weapons to the Central African Republic (CAR) following an increase in violence. In the subsequent months, Russia provided personnel, estimated by US officials at 400, mostly through private military companies (PMCs) to training centers around the country. More recently, Russian support of Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan National Army in Libya has enabled it to advance in Tripoli against the UN-recognized Government of National Accord and raised the specter of competing Turkish intervention. In the month following an August 2019 security agreement with Mozambique, at least 160 Russian military personnel were said to be conducting counterterrorist operations in the Cabo Delgado region.

Its military involvement enables Russia to offset its economic weakness in the region. Russia’s ability to provide economic assistance is far more limited than that of China or the United States. Its trade with Africa is similarly dwarfed. In 2017, Russia reached $4.2 billion in trade compared to $165 billion for China and $37 billion for the United States. Providing military assistance in the form of both weapons and personnel gives Russia outsized influence, requiring continued Russian involvement for training and resupply. Russia also gains influence in peace settlements and in the post-war contracts. Epitomizing Russian influence, Valery Zakharov, a Russian citizen, was named as a national security advisor to the president of the Central African Republic.

This paper presents a survey of Russia’s military interventions in Africa since 2016 that utilized either Russian military personnel or those of Russian PMCs, such as the Wagner Group, into existing conflicts on the continent. These include wars in Libya and the Central African Republic and counterterror actions in Mozambique.

When, for whom, and how Russia intervenes will be explored. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Russia is stepping in where other countries, notably the United States and France, are leaving a vacuum. In terms of direction of intervention, Judd Devermont of the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated, “The Russians go all in on the incumbent.” These assertions may not be upheld. Russia’s support for Haftar in Libya partially contradicts Russian support for sitting governments. Instead, it appears that Russia is supportive of whichever side is likely to win the conflict or have a strong position going into peace negotiations.

Perhaps most importantly, the question of the effect of Russian involvement on the ground will be explored. In Libya, as it did in Syria, Russian military involvement has clearly strengthened the ability of the supported group to defeat the opponent in direct combat. In the CAR, Russia helped negotiate a peace agreement among combatants. Yet whether Russian assistance can enable a government to defeat a terrorist or insurgent threat or to solidify a peace is far more in question. Its reliance on PMCs, while giving it a degree of deniability, may also hinder its ability—or signal its lack of intention—to help build a peaceful state. Drawing on evidence from ACLED, news sources, and thinktanks, levels of violence and other indicators of stability will be assessed to understand the effects of Russian military intervention.

The motto for the Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum was “For Peace, Security and Development.” Yet Russia’s greatest opportunities on the continent have come from violence and insecurity. This paper explores how Russia is taking advantage of those opportunities and whether its role is helping, or hindering, the creation of peace and security.

Author

• Andrea M. Lopez, Susquehanna University