Cooperation in the Shadow of Future Crisis: Coup Risk and Regional Organizations

• In Event: Security Organizations in Evolving Global and Regional Orders

Abstract

How do leaders in coup-prone states change their foreign policy strategies to boost their survival odds? This paper investigates the role that regional cooperation plays in improving the tenure and post-tenure prospects of vulnerable leaders. The paper introduces a theoretical model of regional integration organizations as mutual insurance clubs that are of particular value to more vulnerable and culpable member state leaders. I argue that leaders from coup-prone states consider their expected likelihood of requesting regional integration organizations' (RIO) assistance for regime stabilization in the future when deciding whether to cooperate. Leaders also consider whether repressive tactics used to remain in power could force them to seek exile through neighboring states. Combined, this influences leaders to increase contributions to regional security operations. I test the observable implication that vulnerable and culpable leaders should be more likely to contribute to regional security operations to generate goodwill. I analyze variation in contributions to “local" security across Africa and those MENA states that share regional organization memberships with African states over time. I find that at-risk leaders who have overseen significant human rights violations contribute more consistently to security and peacekeeping missions in their own neighborhood.

Author

• Christina Cottiero, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation