Logistics and Military Power: Tooth, Tail, and Territory in Conventional Warfare

• In Event: Resources, Logistics, and War

Abstract

There is a broad consensus that logistics is a major determinant of the course and outcome of military conflicts, but little work rigorously explores when and how it matters. This paper closes this gap. First, I develop a theory connecting the logistical capacity of military forces to a standard measure of military power: the ability to control territory in large-scale, conventional ground combat. My central claim is that to control territory successfully depends on more than just whether a military force has enough firepower ("tooth") to overcome its enemy on the battlefield, but also on whether that force has enough logistical capacity ("tail") to reach and hold its objectives. If it does not, it will fall short of its territorial objectives on the battlefield. Resource constraints and institutional biases ensure the difficulties of "force balancing" and indeed many forces have failed to field enough tail to make success possible. Second, I supplement my argument and discuss why the amount of tail required is proportional to the size of the territorial objective. Third, I evaluate my theory using a carefully selected historical case: the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In sum, I find that more is not always better when it comes to combat materiel. My findings have important implications for the way scholars understand military power such as the offense-defense balance and the determinants of military effectiveness. It also bears on several US defense policy debates, including how to build effective partner militaries, how to assess the threat foreign militaries pose to US interests around the world, and how best to structure the US Army and Marine Corps for major combat operations.

Author

• Ryan Baker, US Marine Corps