Moral Posturing and Provocation in International Bargaining

• In Event: Provocation, Escalation, and Duration

Abstract

How does moral rhetoric affect crisis escalation during international bargaining? I provide evidence that when countries rely on principled arguments, they decrease the probability of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of a dispute escalating with military action. Rather than demonstrating resolve and inducing compliance, the language provokes the other side to escalate in turn. I illustrate the mechanisms of this theory through a brief case study of the Vietnam War and provide quantitative evidence that moral arguments increase the severity of violence during crises involving the United States between 1980 and 2015. This theory challenges existing rationalist theories of International Relations, which dismiss moral language as inconsequential rhetoric with no real impact on either state behavior or dispute outcomes. The findings also provide important insights into the current dynamics of leadership rhetoric on the international stage.

Author

• Abigail Post, Dartmouth College