Leasing Democracy: How Renters are Excluded in American Politics

• In Event: Inequality and Heterogeneity

Abstract

A wide array of research documents the stark over-representation of homeowners in local politics. Much of this scholarship explores the political behavior and preferences of homeowners, with comparatively little research centered on political elites. In this paper, we aim to better understand the financial lives of politicians, and their reliance on homeownership and landlord protections. Across both the United States and comparative contexts, we document when (and if) elected officials are renters. We also explore whether and when elected officials serve as landlords. This research illuminates the extent to which politicians financially depend on homeownership and protections for homeowners—often at the expense of renters. Using roll call data when available, we consider whether homeowner and landlord politicians hold different preferences on key housing issues compared to their counterparts who rent. These analyses contribute to our understanding of the marginalization of renters in local, state, and national political decision-making.

Authors

• Katherine Levine Einstein, Boston University

• Maxwell B. Palmer, Boston University