Do Ghosts Exist? Clientelistic Networks and Corruption in Public Education

• In Event: The Political Economy of Education in the Developing World

Abstract

We study the effect of political alignment between local (municipal) and regional (departmental) politicians on false or "ghost" students, fabricated by local politicians and bureaucrats to obtain more transfers from the national government. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we show that the proportion of ghost students is larger in municipalities where the candidate from the governor's party is elected. Effects are larger in "autonomous municipalities" that have more discretion over resource spending, where there are weaker institutions, and where teachers and other school staff are less qualified. Also, the quality and quantity of education are not higher in aligned areas.
Instead, in these places there is more subsequent electoral fraud and more complaints
about disciplinary violations by public functionaries, especially in the education sector.
We also find some suggestive (though less conclusive) evidence that incumbent parties
and politicians have better future electoral and employment prospects in aligned areas.
The findings are consistent with the interpretation that resource extraction is particularly valuable to politicians whose political network is connected to higher echelons of power, and that areas with weaker accountability and more discretion for diversion of resources for the reproduction of the clientelistic network engage more in this form of corruption, in which a substantial part of the money is being diverted for political and economic gain rather than to improve the quantity or quality of the service.

Author

• Leopoldo Fergusson, Universidad de los Andes