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Who Gets Constituent Service?

Thu, September 10, 10:00 to 11:30am MDT (10:00 to 11:30am MDT), TBA

Abstract

Advocating on behalf of constituents in their dealings with government agencies is one way that members of Congress serve their constituents. Little is known, however, about the ways in which the provision of constituent service may be biased. Despite the nonpartisan nature of constituent service, legislators may prioritize helping constituents whom they infer to be potential supporters or whom they deem as more deserving of their help. While underserved groups like immigrants, constituents with disabilities, and low-income constituents may require more help navigating the federal bureaucracy, they may be less likely to reach out to their legislators for help, and they may also be less likely to receive help if they ask for it. Constituents’ asking for help with particular types of issues or programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security, veterans’ benefits, and immigration, may provide cues to members of Congress about constituents’ characteristics and their potential deservingness of help. Additionally, factors such as race, income, disability status, age, or veteran status may influence the likelihood that constituents receive help from their legislators, as legislators may prioritize assisting particular types of constituents who are part of their electoral base.

Using a novel dataset of congressional correspondence with all federal agencies covering the years 2007 through 2019 and obtained through over 400 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, we test for inequities in the provision of constituent service by examining members’ contacts with federal agencies on behalf of underrepresented groups. We assess inequities both across and within congressional districts, examining which types of districts receive more assistance and which constituents within districts receive more assistance. To assess district-level inequities in constituent service, we compare the volume of legislators’ contacts with federal agencies on behalf of types of individual constituents, including veterans, immigrants, Social Security recipients, and Medicare and Medicaid recipients, with the populations of those individuals within each member’s congressional district. Doing so also allows us to control for demand-side factors that may influence legislators’ constituent service activity. We then explore which types of constituents receive the most attention from legislators within districts. We examine legislators’ contacts with agencies that serve particular types of constituents, including the Social Security Administration, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Veterans’ Administration, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review within the Department of Justice. We also use keywords and constituent information, including names, contained in correspondence logs to identify constituents’ demographic characteristics and assess the provision of constituent service to disadvantaged groups. Our results have implications for biases in representation and for the interaction of underrepresented constituencies with both Congress and the bureaucracy.

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