Term-Extending Constitutional Reforms and Authoritarian Survival

• In Event: Constitutional Reforms for Particularistic Ends in Democracies and Autocracies

Abstract

This paper seeks to demonstrate, using authoritarian, hybrid and even democratic regimes, that beyond “window dressing,” some incumbent executives seek to conduct constitutional replacements to promote their own personal ambitions. This claim furthers extant research by demonstrating a concrete reason for expending all the national resources to undertake the writing of a new constitution with the express purpose of undermining democratic elections and extending their own abilities to run for additional terms. Using survival analysis, we take this analysis one step further than previous studies. Using the intersection of Elkins et. al.’s (2014) Comparative Constitutional Project (CCP) dataset of all constitutions from 1789-2013 and Goemens et. al.’s (2016) Archigos dataset of all political leaders from independent states from 1875 to 2015, to show that when authoritarians undertake multiple constitutional reforms, their tenure in office continues for an average of 11 years, whereas democrats who reform constitutions more than once remain in office an additional five years. The median survival rate, in a given year, of authoritarians and democrats who do not reform constitutions is about one year.

Authors

• Tofigh Maboudi, Loyola University Chicago

• Ghazal Poshtkouhian Nadi, Loyola University Chicago

• Todd A. Eisenstadt, American University