Constitutional Change and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis

• In Event: Constitutional Reforms for Particularistic Ends in Democracies and Autocracies

Abstract

Do the political origins of constitutions matter for the establishment and deepening of democracy? In this paper, we argue that the liberal dimension of democracy is most likely to improve when new constitutions are adopted through cooperation among representatives of a plurality of political forces. The dispersion of political power in constitution-making bodies favors the acceptance of shared rules that place limits on government authority and enable opposition parties and citizens alike to detect and punish constitutional transgressions. Yet incumbents may renege on the original bargain if opponents do not keep sufficient social support and institutional influence during the implementation stage. For this reason, we also argue that the salutary effect of inclusive constitutional agreements on liberal democracy should be larger during the early years of life of the new constitution, when the identity of and balance of power among the political forces that created it tend to remain stable. The empirical analysis of an original global dataset on the origins of constitutions adopted or implemented under democracy between 1900 and 2015 provides support to these arguments. We also find that whereas direct citizen participation during constitution writing does not have an impact on liberal democracy the active involvement of citizens in autonomous civil society organizations is key for its progress.

Authors

• Gabriel L. Negretto, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile

• Mariano Sanchez-Talanquer, El Colegio de México