The Prevalence of Particularistic over Public Goods Constitutional Reforms

• In Event: Constitutional Reforms for Particularistic Ends in Democracies and Autocracies

Abstract

Using a large-scale data set covering constitutional reforms since 1985 in Latin America’s presidential systems, this paper demonstrates the prevalence of using constitutional reforms for the particularistic purpose of increasing a leader’s term in office, rather than for the more public purpose of “re-centering” a nation’s social contract. Upon addressing the statistical prevalence of particularistic constitutional reforms over public goods reforms in the world’s region with the greatest number of reforms, the paper focuses on conditions which might motivate a turn to more public goods-oriented reforms, using most different cases of Bolivia (where Evo Morales was expelled from the presidency after attempting particularistic reforms in 2019) and Chile (where a wave of protests in 2019 has led President Sebastián Piñera to launch national consideration of a new constitution in 2020.

Authors

• Todd A. Eisenstadt, American University

• Carla Alberti, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile

• Diego Diaz-Rioseco, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile

• Tofigh Maboudi, Loyola University Chicago

• Ghazal Poshtkouhian Nadi, Loyola University Chicago