Anarchic Bargain: Power Trajectories and the Tradeoff Motivating Order Formation

• In Event: Change, Stability, and Hierarchy in International Orders

Abstract

Abstract: How do states build lasting international order? Existing explanations of order formation argue that leading states are incentivized to create binding institutions with robust rules and strong enforcement mechanisms. The stability resulting from such institutionalized orders, scholars argue, allows leading states to geopolitically punch above their weight after they have declined in power. I argue, however, that such explanations overlook the tradeoff between stability and flexibility, that leading states are faced with. Flexibility calls for short-term agreements that can be renegotiated when the strategic situation changes. And it allows the leading state to take advantage of relative power increases. Whereas states face significant incentives to err on the side of stability if they predict irreversible decline in power, states face incentives to err on the side of flexibility if they predict relative rise in power. By highlighting these competing incentives, I demonstrate that the U.S.-sponsored post-WWII international order was not a long-term institutional project designed to stabilize U.S. hegemony, but was rather intended as a situational order that could be amended when the strategic circumstances changed.

Author

• Mariya Grinberg, University of Chicago