Salience, Vulnerability and Responsiveness: An Elite Experiment in Two Countries

• In Event: Congruence and Democratic Responsiveness

Abstract

Theories of electoral competition and dynamic representation hold that responsiveness increases when representatives (or parties) are electorally vulnerable and when salient policy issues are at stake. We test these propositions at the individual level using a preregistered experimental design, where citizens contact their respective representative about a policy issue in all electoral districts in France and Germany. Either citizens ask their representative about the most important problems, namely the economy or immigration, or they inquire about marginal concerns, specifically voting age or online gambling. We measure a legislator’s responsiveness based on answering to these citizen queries. Contrary to our expectations, representatives are more likely to respond to marginal policy issues than to salient ones. Representatives from save seats are also more likely to respond. These findings prompt us to explore three alternative mechanisms - issue complexity, divisiveness and professionalization - and rethink macro-level findings on responsiveness and unequal representation.

Authors

• Christian Breunig, University of Konstanz

• Emiliano Grossman, Sciences Po

• Miriam Hänni, Universität Konstanz