Losing Control: Corruption Prosecution and its Effects on Legislative Behavior

• In Event: The Contradictory Potential of Accountability Institutions in Latin America

Abstract

In the wake of the fight against corruption, Latin America has recently witnessed a wave of corruption prosecutions against high-level politicians. This paper contributes to the study of this phenomenon by analyzing the conditions under which criminalizing a politician can weaken his or her party’s control of its members. My theory argues that when the party is electorally strong, meaning that they enjoy the constituents’ support, judicial investigations and detentions do not affect partisan control. However, members of a party with little support are more sensible to corruption scandals, and thus are more willing to defy the leadership. Using the case of Mexico — where several former governors have been indicted or arrested in the past decade — I look at the behavior of legislators before and after corruption prosecution. I show that prosecution of a governors is associated with a decrease in party discipline and a higher rate of party defection, but only when the prosecuted governor’s party has lost the gubernatorial seat. In states where parties have maintained the local executive office, a corruption scandal has no impact on legislative behavior. The theory and results presented here shed light on the conditions under which parties are affected when their members are involved in a judicial proceeding, thus contributing to the study of the political consequences of criminalizing politicians that had hitherto enjoyed impunity.

Author

• Milena Ang Collan Granillo, UT - San Antonio