The Development and Impacts of Presidential Reputations for Lying

• In Event: Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy

Abstract

We would hope that when a president lies, their credibility takes a hit – but is this really the case, and if so who actually imposes these reputational costs? Despite a large literature on the dynamics of reputations for resolve, we know little to nothing about if, when, and with whom presidents develop reputations for lying. In this paper, we take the first steps towards filling this gap. We draw on literature from behavioral economics to argue that lying does have reputational costs, but only under specific circumstances and among a particular subset of the public. We use a vignette-style survey experiment to examine the individual traits and dispositions that predict a greater or lower acceptance of presidential lying, and test the conditions under which a presidential lie prompts these citizens to impose reputational costs. Our novel application of reputational theory to presidential truthfulness and the findings that our realistic experiment produce should encourage future scholars to expand studies of reputation to include behavioral traits like truthfulness, especially given the increasing relevance of presidential honesty.

Authors

• Keren Yarhi-Milo, Princeton University

• David Ribar, Princeton University