Managing Political Uncertainty

• In Event: People, Boards, and Leaders: Individual Backgrounds and Motivations in IPE

Abstract

Under what circumstances can unelected technocrats compensate for political and policy uncertainties generated by unpredictable politicians? Contemporary commentators offer often vivid examples of the negative consequences of the unmanageability of leaders like Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un, but their assessments are necessarily limited by a focus on current policies for which the consequences cannot yet be fully known. To understand the circumstances under which technocrats can shape the content and consequences of policy in turbulent political environments, I examine how changes in the power dynamics between national leaders and senior economic technocrats (including central bankers, finance ministers and treasury secretaries) affected the content and consequences of national economic policy decisions in Argentina, the United States, and Europe over the past thirty years. Their efforts to manage market expectations and shape the behavior of international investors before, during and after financial crises provide laboratories for analyzing the circumstances under which technocrats can manage national political and policy uncertainties and, by so doing, influence both the policies that are chosen and how those policies are likely to be interpreted by international actors.

Author

• George E. Shambaugh, Georgetown University