Explaining Strategy in Russian Online Disinformation about Syria

• In Event: How States Spread and Citizens Respond to Misinformation under Authoritarianism

Abstract

Online state-sponsored disinformation takes varying forms. Governments create and artificially amplify Twitter hashtags to push foreign policy objectives. They hack, alter, and leak documents. They create fake online personas who share opinions about political events along with untrue information. While much political science research exists on overt state propaganda, we know little about when and why states adopt different online disinformation strategies. In this paper we first categorize these strategies, and then look at thousands of now-removed Facebook posts about Syria that Facebook has attributed to the Russian military intelligence (GRU) or the Internet Research Agency (IRA). By comparing the content and reach of these posts, we inductively generate a theory to explain why the GRU and IRA chose to use different strategies.

Authors

• Renee DiResta, Stanford Internet Observatory

• Shelby Grossman, Stanford University