Bargaining Power and Nuclear Energy Regulation after Three Mile Island

• In Event: Poster Session: Science, Technology, and Environmental Politics & Health Politics and Health Policy
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Science, Technology, and Environmental Politics

Abstract

When political entities bargain, it is often assumed that the entity that gets more of what it wants has the stronger bargaining position. However, as I show, when multiple dimensions are at stake, it is often the weaker entity that gets larger concessions—because the stronger entity will already have been sated on the dimension it cares more about. I apply this result to the policy response by the NRC and public utility commissions to the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) to determine the comparative bargaining power of the public and the energy industry at that time.

The two major policy dimensions in nuclear power are environmental safety and price. The public demands safe energy at a low price while the energy industry prefers less stringent safety regulations and higher prices. Further, industry typically cares more about price (relative to safety) than does the public. After TMI, there was an enormous drop in perceived safety that pushed policy off the contract curve. In negotiating back to the that curve, the players agreed on only a small increase in safety. While the NRC introduced a variety of new regulations, the vast majority of the nuclear plants already in operation remained open; and many already under construction were completed. Thus, there was a large net drop in perceived safety. Paired with the marginal increase in electricity prices and interpreted within the model, this implies that the energy industry was the more powerful bargainer in this case.

This paper contributes to our understanding of bargaining in general, bureaucratic accountability and responsiveness, the effects of accidents and disasters on public policy and public opinion, and industry influence in regulation.

Author

• John M. Chambers, Princeton University