Assets, Decision-making and Legitimacy in NATO and the EU’s Peacebuilding

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security I

Abstract

How do international organizations (IOs) like NATO and the European Union (EU) conduct their peacebuilding? How do institutional assets, decision-making and international legitimacy affect the efficacy of their peacebuilding operations? Drawing from an original dataset on NATO and EU operations, this paper applies fuzzy-set qualitative comparative (fs/QCA) analysis and case-study process-tracing methods to compare and contrast these two IOs’ handing of their peacebuilding operations. Specifically, the model presented in this paper focuses on operational budget, personnel, time needed to implement a decision to launch a peacebuilding operation, number of contributing nations, and international legitimization in form of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval while also controlling for operational duration, changes in mission mandate and changes in the external environment.
Our previous work, consistent with the institutional adaptability theory (Wallander, 2000), identifies four ideal types of organizational response to emerging threats based on the availability of organizational assets and the structure of decision-making that lead to an “efficient response,” a “muddling through,” a “stop-and-go” response, or “organizational ineptitude.” A separate study on EU missions and operations showed that the organization is reluctant to engage in peacebuilding efforts without having adequate budgetary and personnel assets which makes it a “a prudent peacebuilder” (Ivanov and Kovac, forthcoming 2020).
Drawing from both NATO and EU missions and operations, this paper validates the institutional adaptability perspective and finds that when both IOs deploy sufficient personnel and display rapid decision-making, they do not need external legitimization (in terms of large number of contributing nations and support by UNSC); however, when mission personnel is insufficient and decision-making is slow, then larger operational budgets and international legitimization in the form of UN resolutions are necessary to ensure NATO and the EU’s effective organizational response. These two outcomes are illustrated by the EU’s Artemis Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the EUCAP Nestor Mission in Somalia. Furthermore, the paper surveys NATO’s ISAF Operation in Afghanistan to demonstrate both the “efficient response” and “institutional ineptitude” outcomes of NATO peacebuilding. Lastly, the study compares and contrasts the EU’s EUCAP SAHEL Mission in Niger with NATO’s KFOR Operation in Kosovo to show how the presence of rapid decision-making is insufficient to ensure high efficacy of organizational response if the operational budget and the support by the UN are limited, thus resulting in a “stop-and-go” response to peacebuilding. We suggest in the concluding sections several valuable policy recommendations how to improve these two organizations’ handing of peacebuilding operations in the future.

Author

• Ivan Dinev Ivanov, University of Cincinnati