The Effect of Firm Lobbying on High-Skilled Visa Issuance

• In Event: Political Economy of Migration: Driving Policies and Destabilization

Abstract

High-skilled workers are critical to firm productivity. Yet many political or cultural factors can lead governments to restrict the migration of these workers. Does lobbying help firms overcome barriers to immigration and increase their access to global talent? This study sheds light on the question by focusing on the case of U.S. firms and an exogenous increase in high-skilled visa denial rates following the election of Trump in 2016. Using a series of difference-in-differences designs that combine firm-level lobbying reports with the universe of H-1B and L-1 high-skilled visa petitions from 1990 to 2017, I find that firms’ lobbying activities under the Trump administration reduced denial rates on their visa petitions. Examining the targeted venues during this period, I find an increase in the lobbying of executive agencies that hold influence over visa decisions. These findings contribute to a fast-growing empirical literature on the effectiveness of lobbying. More broadly, however, the results suggest that lobbying may lead to welfare distortions by creating unequal access to global talent across firms.

Author

• Steven Liao, University of California, Riverside