Parliamentary Resistance and Authoritarian Consolidation in Central Asia

• In Event: Parliaments Under Fire: Explaining Legislative Closures

Abstract

Contemporary scholars broadly agree that legislatures benefit dictators: authoritarian regimes with them tend to both last longer and enjoy higher levels of economic growth than their counterparts without (Geddes 1999; Boix 2003; Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008). However, legislatures can also threaten autocrats by serving as centers of opposition to their rule. In the former Soviet Union, inherited parliaments -- the former republic-level Supreme Soviets -- often emerged as key battlegrounds over the distribution of political power. Throughout post-Soviet Central Asia, however, aspiring dictators sought to turn these legislatures from threat to tool. What conditioned the outcomes (including closure) of these struggles? I address these questions by comparing three Central Asian countries which, in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, faced parliaments that actively challenged the president for political supremacy: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. These countries had different rates of success in bringing parliament under firm executive control, ranging from failure and regime change to almost immediate authoritarian consolidation. Using comparative historical analysis, I trace their outcomes to three key factors: when the president deployed particular strategies to hamstring parliament, approaches to managing regional elites, and access to economic resources. In doing so, the paper provides insight into the process by which aspiring autocrats become entrenched dictators, and the key role that parliament can play in resisting or facilitating that transition.

Author

• Margaret Hanson, Arizona State University